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Abstrat
A general tehnique ombining model heking and abstration is presented that
allows property based analysis of systems onsisting of an arbitrary number of fea-
tured omponents. We show how parameterised systems an be speied in a guarded
ommand form with onstraints plaed on the variables whih our in guards. We
prove that results that hold for a small number of omponents an be shown to
sale up. We then show how featured systems an be speied in a similar way, by
relaxing the onstraints on the guards. The main result is a generalisation theorem
for featured systems whih we apply to two well known examples.
1 Introdution
Model-heking is a popular and eetive tehnique for reasoning about dis-
tributed, onurrent systems, partiularly networks of ommuniating om-
ponents. But, there is a limitation { only a single, tratable model an be
heked. In this paper we onsider the problem of how to relate an individual
model heking result about a system of xed size and onguration, to the
general ase. Namely, does a result for a given system sale to a system of
any size { an we leverage a general result from a spei one? This ques-
tion annot be answered by model-heking alone beause it is an example of
the well known parameterised model heking problem (PMCP) whih is, in
general, undeidable [3℄. But, for some lasses, we an nd a model-heking
solution. This paper introdues a model-heking solution for systems of om-
muniating omponents. The onstraint is that the omponents fulll riteria

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whih allow them to be safely abstrated. We all this safe with respet to the
abstration.
An example is the following. We an prove a property , say, holds for a model
of a system with 3 onurrent omponents, p
0
, p
1
p
2
i.e. M(p
0
jjp
1
jjp
2
) j= .
Now onsider the question, given another omponent p
3
, under what ondi-
tions does M(p
0
jjp
1
jjp
2
jjp
3
) j=  hold? More generally, given a nite number
of further omponents, under what onditions does the property still hold?
How an we leverage the proof of the property for the system of xed size
(i.e. for 3 omponents) to the proof of the more general ase? Moreover, when
would the property not hold?
To answer these questions, there are a number of aspets to onsider
 what is the form of ? Can it refer to propositions about any loal or global
variable, or variables indexed by any omponent?
 what is the ommuniation topology of the system? Can the omponents
ommuniate peer to peer, or in xed topology suh as a star or hyperube?
 what is the relationship between omponents? Must they be isomorphi? If
not, what are the onstraints on the behaviour of the omponents?
To illustrate all of these points, onsider two paradigms: a network of peer
to peer User omponents and a network of Client omponents with a single
Server omponent (see gure 1). Suppose we an show that, in the former
paradigm with four User omponents, if two User omponents have estab-
lished eah other as partner they will eventually beome onneted. Would
the result hold if there were ve User omponents in the network? Would the
result hold if the property referred to spei Users, for example it stated that
User 1 ould eventually be onneted to User 5? Clearly the result would not
hold for systems of less than six omponents. Similarly, suppose we an show,
in the seond paradigm with three Client omponents, that a message sent to
the Server will eventually be delivered to its destination. Would the same be
true if there were more Client omponents? What if the Clients had dierent
behaviour? For example, would the property still hold if some of the Clients
had a forwarding apability, or some of the Clients had the ability to invoke a
forwarding apability on the destination Client? We would expet the former
to be true, but not neessarily the latter.
The aim of our approah is a tehnique whih makes these aspets expliit.
The approah relies on partitioning omponents into two distint subsets:
onrete omponents and abstrat omponents. The former are the omponents
involved in the xed system analysis, i.e. the omponents p
0
, p
1
, p
2
above. The
abstrat omponents are the remaining omponents in the systems of larger or
arbitrary size. For example, p
3
, or more generally, p
3
: : : ; p
n 1
are the abstrat
omponents. The property  an only refer to global variables, or variables
2
Fig. 1. Example Networks
indexed by the onrete omponents. The onrete and abstrat omponents
do not need to be isomorphi, but the abstrat omponents must be safe
with respet to the abstration in the sense that their presene or otherwise
does not aet the underlying behaviour of the overall system, with respet
to a given property. The topology is assumed to be either stati and regular,
or dynami and peer to peer (fully onneted). There is one ommuniation
hannel assoiated with eah omponent.
The main ontribution of this paper is to dene an abstration and prove that
basi omponents and omponents with ertain ategories of features whih
onform to syntati riteria are safe with respet to our abstration.
1.1 Overview of paper
In the next setion we review bakground material, e.g. parameterised systems,
features, Kripke strutures, temporal logis and model heking. In setion 3
we give an overview of our approah to solving PMCP by abstration and
introdue the onept of a safe omponent. In setion 4 the approah is devel-
oped in more detail for basi parameterised systems. We apply the tehniques
to two example systems: peer to peer telephony and lient-server email and
demonstrate that the omponents in these systems are safe with respet to
the abstration. In setion 5 we extend the abstration approah to featured
systems. We extend the two examples to more omplex ones with features. We
show that when the features onform to ertain syntati riteria, the om-
ponents are still safe, thus we an again solve PMCP. In setion 6 we disuss
the impliations of our approah for failed formulae, i.e. what an we onlude
when a property fails to be satised. Automation and experimental results are
disussed in setion 7, related work is disussed in setion 8 and onlusions
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are given in setion 9.
2 Bakground
2.1 Parameterised systems and network invariants
The type of system we are interested in is parameterised, onurrent sys-
tems. A parameterised system has the form S
n
= p
0
jjp
1
jj : : : jjp
n 1
or S
n
=
Cjjp
0
jjp
1
jj : : : jjp
n 2
where p
0
; p
1
; : : : ; p
n 1
are instantiations of the same pa-
rameterised proess p, and C a distinguished ontext proess (sometimes alled
an environment proess) { for example a hub or server proess. jj is parallel
omposition. The veriation of suh systems - that is, the proof that proper-
ties hold for suh systems for any value of n greater than some lower bound n
0
,
is both hallenging and important. Parameterised systems our frequently {
in distributed algorithms for example.
It is not possible to verify suh systems (for any n) using model heking
alone [3℄. However, one approah that has proved suessful for verifying
some parameterised systems involves the onstrution of a network invari-
ant [6,29,15℄. The network invariant I represents an arbitrary member of the
family F = fS
n
: n  n
0
g and proof of a given property  for I an be shown
to imply that any member of the family F satises .
Some other tehniques that have been used to verify parameterised systems
inlude those based on theorem proving [17℄, on abstration [27℄, or on a
ombination of the two [28℄. A further method is to use expliit indutive
tehniques ombined with model heking [23,20,32,35℄.
We introdue an invariant-based approah whih ombines abstration and in-
dution to verify parameterised systems. Our invariant proess is onstruted
by modifying a Promela speiation for a network of xed size, and using
SPIN to onstrut the orresponding Kripke struture. Our approah is an ex-
ample of how an invariant proesses an be onstruted in pratie, to extend
results proved for small, xed sized models, to results whih hold for models
of any size.
We show how our approah an be extended to systems in whih omponents
are still expressed in a well-dened way, but individual omponents may be
distinguished by way of features.
Like all network invariant approahes, this approah is limited to systems
with a regular topology, whih grow in a regular way as the number of ompo-
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nents inreases. The example networks we onsider have either a peer to peer
topology (a telephone system) or a lient-server topology (email). We hoose
asynhronous ommuniation to reet realisti systems, and allow dynami
ommuniation (hannels are passed on hannels).
2.2 Features
Network omponents may have dierent funtionality. The mehanism for
struturing funtionality additional to a basi behaviour is ommonly alled
a feature. The onept originated in telephony where features suh as all
forwarding, ring bak when free, et. are added to a basi all behaviour.
Features fundamentally aet basi behaviour in dierent ways, and so om-
ponents with features are not, in general, isomorphi. Moreover, the features
assoiated with one omponent an aet the behaviour of other (possibly
featured) omponents.
A parameterised omponent is said to subsribe to a feature f (belonging to
a given set of features), and a parameterised system S
n
= p
0
jjp
1
jj : : : jjp
n 1
(or Cjjp
0
jjp
1
jj : : : jjp
n 2
) is featured when (at least one of) the omponents p
0
,
p
1
; : : : ; p
n 1
(or C, p
0
, p
1
; : : : ; p
n 2
) subsribes to at least one feature.
2.3 Temporal logi
We provide a desription of the syntax and semantis of the logis CTL

and
LTL. We use LTL to dene our partiular properties of simple telephone and
email systems in setion 4.4.
The logi CTL

is dened as a set of state formulas, where the CTL

state and
path formulas are dened indutively below. The quantiers A and E are used
to denote for all paths, and for some path respetively (where E = :A:).
In addition, X, [, hi and [℄ represent the standard nexttime, strong until,
eventually and always operators (where hi = true [  and [℄ = :hi:
respetively). Let AP be a nite set of propositions. Then
 for all p 2 AP , p is a state formula
 if  and  are state formulas, then so are :,  ^  and  _  
 if  is a path formula, then A and E are state formulas
 any state formula  is also a path formula
 if  and  are path formulas, then so are :,  ^  and  _  , X,  [  ,
hi and [℄f .
The logi LTL is obtained by restriting the set of (CTL

) formulas to those
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of the form A, where  does not ontain A or E. When referring to an LTL
formula, one generally omits the A operator and instead interprets the formula
 as \for all paths ".
For a model M, if the CTL

formula  holds at a state s 2 S then we write
M; s j=  (or simply s j=  when the identity of the model is lear from the
ontext). The relation j= is dened indutively below. Note that for a path
 = s
0
; s
1
; : : :, starting at s
0
, rst() = s
0
and, for all i  0, 
i
is the suÆx of
 starting from state s
i
.
 s j= p, for p 2 AP if and only if p 2 L(s)
 s j= : if and only if not s j=  s j=  ^  if and only if s j=  and s j=  ,
and s j=  _  if and only if s j=  or s j=  
 s j= A if and only if  j=  for every path  starting at s
  j= , for any state formula , if and only if rst() j= 
  j= : if and only if not  j=   j= ^ if and only if  j=  and  j=  ,
and  j=  _  if and only if  j=  or  j=  
  j= [ if and only if, for some i  0, 
i
j=  and  j=  for all 0  j  i
  j= X if and only if 
1
j= 
  j= hi if and only if 
i
j= , for some i  0
  j= [℄ if and only if 
i
j= , for all i  0 .
2.4 Kripke strutures
Model heking involves heking Kripke strutures [14℄ to verify given tem-
poral properties.
Denition 1 Let AP be a set of atomi propositions. A Kripke struture over
AP is a tuple M = (S; S
0
; R; L) where S  S is a nite set of states, S
0
is
the set of initial states, R  S  S is a transition relation and L : S ! 2
AP
is a funtion that labels eah state with the set of atomi propositions true in
that state.
From here on we will assume that all models have a single initial state s
0
.
That is, we assume that S
0
= fs
0
g. We write M j=  to represent s
0
j= .
We also assume that the transition is total, that is, for all s 2 S there is some
s
0
2 S suh that (s; s
0
) 2 R.
Denition 2 Given two Kripke strutures M and M
0
with AP  AP
0
, a
relation H  S  S
0
is a simulation relation between M and M
0
if and only
if for all s and s
0
, if H(s; s
0
) then
(1) L(s) \ AP
0
= L
0
(s
0
)
(2) For every state s
1
suh that R(s; s
1
), there is a state s
0
1
with the property
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that R
0
(s
0
; s
0
1
) and H(s
1
; s
0
1
).
If H(s
0
; s
0
0
), we say that M
0
simulates M and write MM
0
.
The following is derived from a well known result [14℄.
Lemma 3 Suppose that M  M
0
. Then for every LTL formula  with
atomi propositions in AP
0
, M
0
j=  implies M j= .
2.5 Symmetry Groups
In this setion we summarise some denitions from group theory whih we
will use to dene open symmetri omponents in setion 4.
Denition 4 Let G be a non-empty set, and let Æ : G G ! G be a binary
operation. We say that (G; Æ) is a group if G is losed under Æ; Æ is assoiative;
G has an identity element 1
G
; and for eah element x 2 G there is an inverse
element x
 1
2 G suh that x Æ x
 1
= x
 1
Æ x = 1
G
.
We all the operation Æ multipliation in G. When it is lear what the binary
operation is, we simply refer to a group as G rather than (G; Æ), and use
onatenation to denote multipliation.
Denition 5 Let X be a nite set. A permutation of X is a bijetion from
X to X. The set of all permutations of X, Sym(X), forms a group under
omposition of mappings. For any x 2 X, and any  2 Sym(X), we denote
the image of x under  by (x).
2.6 Promela and SPIN
Promela is an imperative language with onstruts for onurreny, nonde-
terminism, asynhronous and synhronous ommuniation, dynami proess
reation, parameterised proesses, and mobile onnetions, i.e. ommuniation
hannels an be passed along other ommuniation hannels. SPIN is the be-
spoke model-heker for Promela and provides several reasoning mehanisms:
assertion heking, aeptane and progress states and yle detetion, and
satisfation of temporal properties.
Given a Promela parameterised system system with form S
n
= p
0
jjp
1
jj : : : jjp
n 1
(or or Cjjp
0
jjp
1
jj : : : jjp
n 2
), the assoiated model, or Kripke struture, is de-
noted byM
n
. In order to perform veriation on a model, SPIN translates eah
proess template into a nite automaton and then omputes an asynhronous
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interleaving produt of these automata to obtain the global behaviour of the
onurrent system. This interleaving produt is referred to as the state-spae.
As well as enabling a searh of the state-spae to hek for deadlok, asser-
tion violations et., SPIN allows the heking of the satisfation of an LTL
formula over all exeution paths. The mehanism for doing this is via never
laims { proesses whih desribe undesirable behaviour, and Buhi automata
{ automata that aept a system exeution if and only if that exeution fores
it to pass through one or more of its aepting states innitely often [26,24℄.
Cheking satisfation of a formula involves the depth-rst searh of the syn-
hronous produt of the automaton orresponding to the onurrent system
(model) and the Buhi automaton orresponding to the never-laim.
Note that in Promela, the symbol `!' is used to denote negation. We use this
form when referring to LTL properties, or propositions in Promela.
2.7 Guarded Command form
For reasoning purposes, we require to assume that omponents are dened
in a given, well dened way. Namely, we assume the guarded ommand, GC,
form whih onsists of one, global loop over a hoie of statements of the
form guard ! ommand. Guards will be over-lapping when the system be-
haviour is non-deterministi. The preise denition of the form depends upon
the speiation language; we have dened it for Promela. In fat, we assume
that eah omponent type is dened within a proess (speially a pro-
type delaration) and (modulo initial variable set up) the protype denitions
themselves have guarded ommand form. In the Promela form, we add addi-
tional program ounter variables, p , to represent loal program ontrol. We
note that in some model heking tools (e.g. Mur [18℄ and SMV [33℄), models
are speied diretly in this form.
Some examples of programs expressed in this modular guarded ommand form
are given in setion 4.3. Note, the Promela do : : : od onstrut provides a
way of expressing a loop in whih ommands are repeatedly seleted non-
deterministially until a break statement is exeuted (there are no break
statements in our examples). Choies are denoted :: statement. In addition,
Promela allows us to group together statements that should be exeuted at
the same time (i.e. before another omponent exeutes a transition) using an
atomi statement. We will heneforth therefore assume that statement hoies
are expressed thus:
:: atomifguard! ommandg
.
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Fig. 2. Peer to peer abstration
We assume that atomi statements an not blok (stritly, they an blok on
the rst statement). This means that if a statement hoie has a ommand
whih involves writing to (reading from) a hannel (han say), we must be sure
that han is not full (empty). Thus the orresponding guard must inlude the
proposition nfull(han) (nempty(han)).
3 The Abstration approah and safe omponents
3.1 Abstration of parameterised systems
Given a parameterised system S
n
of size n, with assoiated model M
n
, and
a xed m (1  m  n), we partition the system omponents into m onrete
omponents and n-m abstrat omponents. We enapsulate the observable
behaviour of the abstrat omponents, with respet to to a given property,
by a new omponent alled Abs and replae all the abstrat omponents by
Abs. Sine the onrete omponents may ommuniate diretly with abstrat
omponents, we may require to modify the ommuniation to/from onrete
omponents. The new abstrat system is p
0
0
jj : : : jjp
0
m 1
jjAbs (or, when there
is a ontext omponent, C
0
jjp
0
0
jj : : : jjp
0
m 2
jjAbs) where (C
0
and) the p
0
i
denote
suitably altered onrete omponents. The assoiated model is denoted by
M
m
abs
.
We illustrate the abstration approah for a peer to peer network, and a lient-
server network in Figures 2 and 3 respetively.
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Fig. 3. Client-server abstration
3.2 Safe omponents
Before we desribe our abstration approah in detail, we dene what is meant
by a safe omponent with respet to our abstration. Assume that the abstrat
model is M
m
abs
.
Denition 6 Given a parameterised system S
n
, m (1  m  n), and formula
 indexed by elements of f0; : : : ; m   1g, the omponents of S
n
are safe with
respet to M
m
abs
if and only if
M
m
abs
j= ) 8n:M
n
j= :
In other words, omponents are safe with respet to the abstration if abstra-
tion of omponents indexed fm; : : : ; n 1g does not alter the behaviour of the
system, with respet to .
Note that the term safe here means the same as abstratable (i.e. our method
is appliable). We prefer safe beause it aptures the notion that, unless strit
guidelines are followed, abstratability (safety) will be violated. In the remain-
der of this paper we omit the ondition with respet to the abstration, when
it is lear from the ontext.
In the next setion we desribe our assumptions on the way basi parame-
terised systems are speied, and show how abstrat models are onstruted
for suh systems in suh a way as to preserve given properties. Thus we demon-
strate that basi omponents are safe with respet to our abstration approah.
In setion 5 we extend the approah to featured systems and show that if the
features are restrited in some way, the omponents remain safe.
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4 Abstration of basi parameterised systems
We assume that all models are speied in modular GC form (see setion 2.7).
Model desriptions onsist of either n   1 instantiations of a single module
delaration, or a single instantiation of a ontext module delaration together
with n  2 instantiations of a further module delaration.
Loal variables assoiated with eah omponent are either: p-variables, the val-
ues of whih are drawn from the set of omponent indies V = fD; 0; 1; : : : ; mg;
-variables, the values of whih are hannel names; and standard variables
(variables whih are not p-variables or -variables) of nite type. The value
D is a default value whih is hosen to take the value of the smallest positive
value not equal to any omponent index. (In the unabstrated ase this is n.)
We restrit our attention to indexed omponents whose behaviour does not
depend upon a given index value, we refer to this as \open symmetry", see
denition 7 below. Note that, if  is a statement hoie, and  2 Sym(V ) a
permutation (see denition 5), then ( ) is a statement hoie obtained from
 by
(1) replaing all propositions x == val
1
, where x is a p variable and val
1
2
V , ontained in the guard of  , with x == (val
1
), and
(2) replaing all assignments of the form y = val
2
, where y is a p variable
and val
2
2 V ontained in the ommand of  , with y == (val
2
).
Denition 7 LetM
n
be the model assoiated with a system of n omponents,
expressed in GC form, and let V denote the set of omponent indies. A set
of parameterised omponents is alled open symmetri if for any statement
hoie  ontained in a omponent speiation, ( ) is also ontained in the
omponent speiation, for all  2 Sym(V ).
As an example, the single statement (x == 1)! y = 42, would violate open
symmetry (unless there were also statements (x == 0) ! y = 0, (x ==
0) ! y = 1 et., for every permutation), but the statement (x == y) ! x =
partner[z℄ would preserve open symmetry.
Denition 8 Components of a system are said to be basi if they are open
symmetri and satisfy the following onditions:
(1) The only global variables present in the system are hannels or variables
that are used for veriation purposes only. All hannels are nite buers,
and there is one hannel assoiated with eah omponent. Variables that
are used for veriation purposes only do not appear in guards.
(2) Eah omponent has, amongst its loal variables, the standard variable
p , denoting its program ounter. In addition, all omponents (exept
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possibly the ontext omponent, when one exists) have the p-variable seld
denoting the omponent index. No operations on this variable are permit-
ted. The value of any other p-variables (general p-variables) an only be
hanged by reading from a hannel, or via non-deterministi hoie. No
other operations, apart from resetting to D, are permitted. In addition,
loal variables may inlude -variables whih denote the hannel names
assoiated with the omponent itself and the omponent with whih the
urrent omponent is ommuniating. Operations on these variables are
restrited as for seld and general p-variables respetively.
(3) All statement hoies within the model speiation of basi parameterised
systems are assumed to have the form:
:: atomif((loalprop)&&(varprop))! ommandg
where loalprop and varprop are onjuntions of propositions onern-
ing loal variables of a omponent, and global variables (hannels) re-
spetively. We assume that in all ases varprop ontains only proposi-
tions onerning the omponents own hannel and/or any other hannel.
These propositions may only take the form of a hek on the status of
a hannel (whether it is full, empty et.), or a poll, whih has the form
han name?[onst℄ and takes the value true if the next message on the
hannel with name han name has value equal to the onstant onst, and
false otherwise.
4.1 Construting the abstrat model
In this setion we show how the onrete omponents are modied and how
the abstrat proess Abs is onstruted. In setion 4.2 we show that due to
the nature of our onstrution of the abstrat system, basi omponents, as
dened above, are safe.
In all ases we have a xed number of onrete omponents (m say). The total
number of omponents is N = m + 1. The abstrat omponent is assumed to
have index Absid whih is set to m, and assoiated hannel abs hannel. The
default value D is set to Absid + 1. There is one hannel for eah onrete
omponent.
We start with peer to peer networks. In this ase, all onrete omponents
have the same form and are modied in the same way.
Reall, any statement hoie in the omponent speiation has the form
:: atomif((loalprop)&&(varprop))! ommandg
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If a statement hoie ontains no propositions onerning global variables (i.e.
varprop is empty) and the orresponding ommand involves updating loal
standard variables or resetting p variables to D only, the statement hoie is
unhanged in the modied omponent.
Suppose that varprop is empty and ommand involves updating (not reset-
ting) loal p-variables to a value from V n D or updating a -variable. We
assume that a given ommand updates all p-variables to the same value, and
any -variables to the same value. If a ommand ontains updates to both
p-variables and -variables then the -variables are updated to the hannel
name assoiated with the value to whih the p-variables are updated. Sine
our omponents are assumed to be open symmetri, the original omponent
speiation will ontain n equivalent statements, one for eah omponent in-
dex. For example, suppose the omponent speiation ontains the statement
hoie:
:: atomif(p  == 4)! partnerid = 0; partner = zerog
where zero is the hannel name assoiated with the omponent with index 0.
Then the omponent speiation will also ontain the statement hoies:
:: atomif(p  == 4)! partnerid = 1; partner = oneg
:: atomif(p  == 4)! partnerid = 2; partner = twog
et. (Note that p  is a standard variable, and so is not permuted.) This list
of statements should be replaed with a list of m statement hoies, orre-
sponding to seleting partnerid as 0, 1, up to m   1 together with a nal
statement:
atomif(p  == 4)! partnerid = Absid; partner = abs hannelg
Statement hoies in whih the varprop is non-empty ontains a proposition
onerning the status of a hannel (whether it ontains a given message, for
example). We onsider the ase where varprop is non-empty and ommand
does not involve reading or writing from/to hannels. Suppose a statement
hoie has assoiated varprop whih only ontains propositions onerning
self . The statement hoie should be left unhanged if the value of partnerid
(or partner) is urrently set to the default value (i.e. a ommuniation has
yet to be established). However, if ommuniation has been established, the
statement hoie should be replaed by a set of statement hoies. The rst
hoie is simply the original hoie in whih the guard is enhaned with the
proposition (partner! = abs hannel) (or (partnerid! = Absid)). In the other
hoies the proposition (partner == abs hannel) (or (partnerid == Absid))
is added to the guard and the proposition querying the status of self is re-
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moved. Eah hoie will have a dierent ommand depending on the assumed
status of the hannel. For example, onsider the statement hoie:
:: atomif((p  == 2)&&(self?[eval(partner)℄))!
MY STATE = talk; p  = 4g
whih would blok if hannel self did not ontain the urrent value of partner
(in Promela, eval(partner) is a onstant assigned to the hannel name ur-
rently assigned to the -variable partner). This would be replaed by the
statement hoies:
:: atomif((p  == 2)&&(partner! = abs hannel)
&&(self?[eval(partner)℄))!MY STATE = talk; p  = 4g
:: atomif((p  == 2)&&(partner == abs hannel))!
MY STATE = talk; p  = 4g
:: atomif((p  == 2)&&(partner == abs hannel))! p  = 2g
All statement hoies in whih the varprop ontains a query of partner and
ommand do not involve a read from, or write to, a hannel, are treated in
the same way.
If ommand involves a read from or write to partner after ommuniation
has been established then, sine we have assumed that (atomi) statement
hoies will not blok, varprop will be non-empty. Assume that varprop only
ontains the assoiated proposition (nempty(partner)), or (nfull(partner)).
The statement hoie should be replaed by three hoies. In the rst hoie,
as before, the guard is enhaned with the proposition (partnerid! = Absid) (or
equivalently, (partner! = abs hannel)) and the ommand unhanged. In the
other hoies, we add the proposition (partnerid == Absid) (or (partner ==
abs hannel)) to the guard and remove the assoiated (nempty(partner)), or
(nfull(partner)) proposition from the guard. In the seond statement hoie
we assume that read (from partner) or write (to partner) is enabled, and the
ommand simply has the read or write ommand removed (we refer to this
as a virtual read or write.) In the third hoie we assume that the read or
write statement is not enabled, and so the ommand is replaed with a simple
ommand to keep p  at its urrent value.
We have desribed how simple statement hoies are replaed in the modied
onrete omponents. Clearly statement hoies an be more ompliated (the
guard may ontain a non-empty varprop and ommand an assignment of
a value to a p-variable, for example). However, by iteratively applying the
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simple modiations, the more omplex statement hoies an be modied in
a natural way.
In lient-server networks, the onrete lient omponents require little modi-
ation, sine they ommuniate only via the server omponent. However, when
seleting a destination for messages, for example, they must now hoose from
the set of onrete lient omponents together with the abstrat omponent.
The server omponent however, requires more modiation. Communiation
with the onrete lients is unhanged, but ommuniation with the abstrat
omponent is modied as for the onrete omponents in the peer to peer
networks (see Figure 3).
Note that (in either network topology) an alternative solution to deiding
whether or not a write (say) to an abstrat partner is bloked (other than
hoosing non-deterministially), is to inlude a global variable bloked say,
whih is non-deterministially set to 0 or 1 by the abstrat proess. In our
abstrat email example (see setion 4.3) we use this alternative approah.
Finally we show how the abstrat proess, Abs is onstruted.
The role of the abstrat proess is to initiate messages. Therefore, Abs plaes
messages on the hannels of any onrete omponent with whih it an diretly
ommuniate. In a peer to peer network this inludes all onrete omponents,
and an a lient-server network this only inludes the server omponent (via the
network hannel). In our telephone example (see setion 4.3) there is no more
behaviour assoiated with Abs. In the email example, the Abs omponent also
has the ability to set the bloked variable (see above).
4.2 Proving that basi omponents are safe
We show that basi omponents, as dened in denition 8 are safe.
Theorem 9 Given a parameterised system
S
n
= p
0
jjp
1
jj : : : jjp
n 1
or Cjjp
0
jjp
1
jj : : : jjp
n 2
with modelM
n
, m (1  m  n), abstrat modelM
m
abs
onstruted as desribed
above, and formula  indexed by elements of f0; : : : ; m 1g, if the omponents
of S
n
are basi, then they are safe.
Proof (sketh) The omponents are safe if M
n
 M
m
abs
. The simulation fol-
lows from the onstrution of M
m
abs
as desribed above: eah statement in the
unabstrated speiation an be mathed (or replaed) by a statement in the
abstrated speiation. At the model level, the mathing is best illustrated
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Fig. 4. Data abstration
Fig. 5. Behavioural abstration
Fig. 6. Stuttering
by Figures 4, 5 and 6. Figure 4 illustrates data abstration [16℄, where a hoie
over n possibilities is mathed by m + 1 possibilities, and when appropriate,
N represents the values fm; : : : ; n   1g. Figure 5 illustrates behavioural ab-
stration: a hoie over (sub) paths of arbitrary length is mathed by a loop.
Note that when this kind of loop is required, for example in the email system
to represent the possibility of bloking, then some liveness properties may not
hold in the abstrated model (see setion 6). Figure 6 illustrates another form
of behavioural abstration: stuttering. States s
1
and s
2
are distint states, but
they are both mathed by t
1
beause the transition from s
1
to s
2
results from
an update to a variable that does not hange in the abstrat model. For exam-
ple, this ould orrespond to the ase of empty ommands in the abstrated
model, representing, say, virtual read or writes to ommuniation hannels.
We now present some examples in detail.
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Fig. 7. Example telephone and email systems
4.3 Some Examples
We illustrate our approah via a simple telephone system and a simple email
system. We rst desribe the systems informally together with a property that
we wish to verify in eah ase. We then provide Promela desriptions of the
systems in modular guarded ommand form and show how these desriptions
are modied to reate an abstrat speiation in eah ase.
4.3.1 An informal desription of the simple telephone and email systems
The telephone system onsists of four instantiations of a User proess, there is
no ontext proess. Proesses are parameterised via proess identier (seld)
and designated hannel name (self ). The email system onsists of four in-
stantiations of a Client proess whih ommuniate via a server proess (the
Network Mailer proess). The topologies are illustrated in Figure 7. Note that
arrows indiate the diretion of ommuniation, not ownership of hannels.
In the simple telephone system User omponents hange state (between idle,
alling and talk) as a result of ommuniation with other proesses (see Figure
8). Suppose a User is in the idle state. It will rst hek to see if their own
hannel is empty, and, if so, hoose a partner whose hannel is also empty. It
then plaes its own hannel name self on both its own hannel and that of
their partner, and proeed to the alling state to wait for a \reply". The User
detets a reply when the ontents of its hannel have been replaed with the
hannel name of partner, and proeeds to the talk state. One in the talk state,
as the initiator of the all, the User an end the all (hang up) by replaing
the message on its partner's hannel with the partner's hannel name, and
removing the ontents of self. Alternatively, a User in the idle state that has
a full hannel will replae the ontents of its partners hannel with self and
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Fig. 8. State transition diagram for simple telephone system (User omponent)
proeed straight to the talk state. The User then waits for its partner to hang
up, removes the ontents of self and returns to idle. An example property for
the simple telephone system is:
Property 1 If User [0℄ has User [1℄ as its partner, and User [1℄ has User [0℄ as
its partner, then User [0℄ and User [1℄ will be onneted before one of them
returns to the idle state.
In the email example, the Client omponents move between two states, namely
initial and end Client (see Figure 9(a)). If a Client omponent in the initial
state reeives a message, it reads the message, reords the identity of the
intended reipient, and moves to the end lient state. In end lient the value
of this reord is reset and the Client returns to the idle state. From the initial
state the Network Mailer proess ontinuously loops around a single state
to hek if there are any messages on its assoiated hannel (network), and
if so, whether the hannel assoiated with the next message on the hannel
is not full. If so, the message is passed on aordingly. (See Figure 9(b).) An
example property for the simple email system is:
Property 2 All messages reeived by Client[0℄ are addressed to Client[0℄.
4.4 Promela speiations for example systems
Promela speiations for the simple telephone and email systems (expressed
in modular guarded form) are given below. Note that this is not the most nat-
ural way to express Promela programs - it prevents us from using goto state-
ments and labels for example (thus in pratie we transform a given Promela
speiation into this form). Assuming Kripke strutures M
4
assoiated with
these speiations, we show how these simple programs are be adapted to
onstrut abstrat speiations, with assoiated models M
2
abs
in eah ase.
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Fig. 9. State transition diagram for simple email system
The Promela speiation for the simple four User telephone system is given
in Figure 10; property 1 is given by:
[℄((s ^ t)!!((!r) [ (v _ w)))
Here r is (onneted[0℄:to[1℄ == 1), s is (partner[0℄ == one), t is
(partner[1℄ == zero), v is MY STATE[0℄ == idle and w is
(MY STATE[1℄ == idle).
Here onneted:to is an array, the elements of whih are variables used for
reasoning purposes only (and so do not appear in guards). When a onnetion
has been established between i and j, onneted[i℄:[j℄ is set to 1 and is (re)set
to 0 otherwise. The partner variables are global here. This is to allow their
values to be \visible" to the never-laim. In all other ways they are treated the
same as the loal hannel names partner desribed in setion 4. The global
variable array MY STATE is also used for veriation purposes only.
The Promela speiation for the simple email system onsisting of three
Client omponents and the Network Mailer omponent is given in Figure
11; property 2 is given by:
[℄(p _ q)
where p is (last del to to[1 ℄ == 1 ), and q is (last del to to[1 ℄ == M ). Here,
last del to to is for veriation purposes only and reords the identity of the
intended reipient; M is a default value.
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Fig. 10. Promela speiation for telephone example with four User omponents
4.4.1 The example abstrat models
The abstrat Promela speiations are given in full in Figures 12 and 13. Note
that in the email example, no abstrat hannel is required beause hannel
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Fig. 11. Promela speiation for email example with four Client omponents and
a Network Mailer omponent
names are not passed between omponents, and all messages delivered to the
abstrat proess are virtual (see setion 4.1).
5 Adding Features
Features are a mehanism for struturing funtionality additional to a basi
behaviour (see setion 2.2).
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Fig. 12. Promela speiation for telephone example with abstration
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Fig. 13. Promela speiation for email example with abstration
We have added features to a basi telephone system and email system [8,10℄.
Note that these speiations are far more omplex than those given in setion
4.3, whih were provided merely to illustrate the basi approah. We therefore
give only an overview here of the relevant aspets and assumptions. Lists of
features for eah of these systems are given in tables 1 and 2; D is a default
value and we assume i 6= j.
We add features to omponents, via feature arrays whih determine whih fea-
tures are subsribed to by whih omponents. Thus additional global variables
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Feature Desription
Call forwarding unonditionally (CFU)
If CFU [i℄ == j, all alls for User [i℄
are forwarded to User [j℄
Call forwarding on busy (CFB)
If CFB[i℄ == j, ifUser [i℄ is busy then
all alls for User [i℄ are forwarded to
User [j℄
Outgoing dial sreening (ODS)
If ODS[i℄ == j, then User [i℄ may not
dial User [j℄'s number
Outgoing all sreening (OCS)
If OCS[i℄ == j, then a all from
User [i℄ to User [j℄ is not possible
Terminating all sreening (TCS)
If TCS[i℄ == j, then a all from
User [j℄ to User [i℄ is not possible
Ring bak when free (RBWF)
If RBWF [i℄! = D, and User [i℄ re-
quests a ringbak to User [j℄ then
a ringbak (from User [i℄) will ensue
when User [j℄ beomes free
Outgoing alls only (OCO)
If OCO[i℄! = D then User [i℄ may not
reeive any alls
Terminating alls only (TCO)
If TCO[i℄! = D then User [i℄ may not
initiate any alls
Return when free (RWF)
If RBW [i℄! = D, and User [j℄ requests
a ringbak to User [i℄ then a ringbak
(from User [i℄) will ensue when User [i℄
beomes free
Table 1
Features (telephone system)
are now allowed to appear in guards. This is the major dierene between basi
omponents and featured omponents.
Suppose then that all global variables are hannels or have the form glob var[i℄,
for some i 2 V . For any global variable glob var[i℄ we assume that there
exist global variables glob var[j℄ for all j 2 V . We assume that all global
variables glob var are feature related (either onerning the elements of a
feature array, or a feature-ag array, see setion 5.1 below) or are used for
veriation purposes only (and so do not appear in guards, as before).
Now we assume that all statement hoies have the form:
:: atomif((feature prop)&&(loalprop)&&(varprop))! ommandg
where feature prop is either empty, or refers to feature related global variables.
If feature prop is not empty, we refer to the statement hoie as a feature
statement hoie, otherwise it is a basi statement hoie.
No omponent with index i an arry out any operation on a global variable
glob var[j℄, for any j 2 V; j 6= i, unless glob var is a feature-ag array and the
operation ours within a feature statement hoie.
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Feature Desription
Enryption (ENC)
If ENC[i℄! = D then all messages sent by Client[i℄ will
be enrypted
Deryption (DEC)
If DEC[i℄! = D then Client[i℄ an derypt all messages
delivered to Client[i℄
Filtering (FT)
If FT [i℄ == j then all messages sent to Client[i℄ by
Client[j℄ will not be delivered
Forwarding (FW)
If FW [i℄ == j then all messages sent to Client[i℄ will be
forwarded to Client[j℄
Autorespond (AR)
If AR[i℄! = D then the rst time Client[j℄ sends a mes-
sage to Client[i℄, an autoresponse message will be sent to
Client[j℄
Mailhost (MH)
If Client[i℄ is not on the mailhost list, it an not reeive
messages
Remail (RM)
If RM [i℄! = D then all messages sent by Client[i℄ will be
delivered under Client[i℄'s pseudonym, and all messages
addressed to Client[i℄'s pseudonym will be delivered to
Client[i℄
Table 2
Features (email system)
Denition 10 Components are said to be safely featured if they satisfy the
assumptions detailed above.
5.1 Categorising features
Reall feature statement hoies have the form
:: atomif(feature prop)&&(loalprop)&&(varprop)! ommandg
Depending on the form of feature prop it is possible to develop a feature
ategorisation. We will subsequently use our ategorisation to determine whih
features an be onsidered safe with respet to our abstration tehnique.
Let us rst onsider feature prop. This has one of the following forms:
feature name[myvar
1
℄ ==myvar
2
or
feature name[myvar
1
℄ ! = D
where feature name is a feature array, myvar
1
and myvar
2
are p-variables,
and either:
(1) myvar
1
is one of the p-variables seld or partnerid, and myvar
2
is
partnerid if myvar
1
is seld , and seld if myvar
1
is partnerid, or
(2) neither myvar
1
or myvar
2
belong to fseld ; partneridg.
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Many features an be divided into three broad ategories aording to whether
they are managed by the feature host, the partner of the feature host, or by
a third party. They are therefore desribed as: host owned, partner owned or
third party owned. These lasses diretly orrespond to whether, in all feature
statement hoies, within all feature prop guards,myvar1 is seld , partnerid,
or some other p-variable. Examples of the rst ategory are ODS (telephone)
and ENC (email). An example of a partner owned feature is CFU. In our email
model, many of the features are handled by the Network Mailer proess,
and so none of our email features are partner owned. Examples of third party
owned features inlude FT and FW whih are owned by a Client proess, but
managed by the Network Mailer proess.
Note that the only one of our example features that an not be desribed in
these terms is RWF. This feature sometimes triggers a hange in behaviour
beause the host omponent has the feature (if the omponent has the feature
and another omponent has requested a ringbak by setting a feature-ag
array element assoiated with the host omponent), and sometimes beause
the partner omponent has the feature (when a request is made by the host
omponent for a ringbak by the partner omponent by setting a feature-ag
array element assoiated with the partner element). As suh, we desribe RWF
as multi-owned.
Denition 11 A feature is said to be multi-owned if it is not host, partner
or third party owned.
5.2 Construting the abstrat model for featured systems
In this setion we provide a sketh of our abstration approah in the pres-
ene of features. We extend the modiations of statement hoies in onrete
omponents (see setion 4.1) to feature statement hoies. We then show for
whih features our abstration approah is still safe. Figures 14 and 15 illus-
trate the approah, the dierent shapes indiate that omponents may not be
isomorphi (beause of the presene of features).
In earlier work [34℄ we have shown how feature statement hoies should be
treated for host owned, partner owned and third party features. We do not
provide full details here, but give an overview.
In all ases, the statement hoie must be split (in the same way as the treat-
ment of basi statement hoies desribed in setion 4.1) aording to whether
the urrent partner is abstrat or not. In the former ase, if the feature is part-
ner owned, two possibilities must be onsidered: whether the partner has the
feature or not. If so, the dierent possible results of applying the feature must
be onsidered.
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Fig. 14. Featured peer to peer abstration
Fig. 15. Featured lient server abstration
For example, the following statement hoie is for CFU :
:: atomif( (state == st diall)&&(CFU [partnerid℄! = default1)
&&(position prop))!
partnerid = CFU [partnerid℄;
partner[seld ℄ = han name[partnerid℄g
Note that state is a loal variable, and position prop a loal variable ontaining
a disjuntion of propositions regarding the urrent value of p  (assoiated
with points in the speiation at whih features are implemented). When
position prop is true but all guards of feature statement hoies are false, p 
is inremented (via another statement hoie, not given here).
Assuming two onrete omponents, this hoie is replaed in the modied
omponent speiation with the following hoies:
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:: atomif( (state == st diall)&&(partnerid! = Absid)
&&(CFU [partnerid℄! = default1 )&&(position prop))!
partnerid = CFU [partnerid℄;
partner[seld ℄ = han name[partnerid℄g
:: atomif( (state == st diall)&&(partnerid == Absid)
&&(forwarding feature == on)&&(position prop))!
partnerid = 0; partner[seld ℄ = zero;
forwarding feature = o g
:: atomif( (state == st diall)&&(partnerid == Absid)
&&(forwarding feature == on)&&(position prop))!
partnerid = 1; partner[seld ℄ = one;
forwarding feature = o g
:: atomif( (state == st diall)&&(partnerid == Absid)
&&(forwarding feature == on)&&(position prop))!
forwarding feature = o g
Here forwarding feature is a loal variable that is non-deterministially set to
on or o in the preeding statement (when the partner is abstrat). The rst
hoie orresponds to the ase when the urrent partner is not and subsribes
to CFU. The remaining hoies orrespond to the ase when the urrent part-
ner is abstrat and forwards to a onrete omponent or to another abstrat
omponent. The forwarding feature variable is reset after the feature has been
applied. One reason for this is that a hain of forwarding within abstrat om-
ponents is observably equivalent to a single forward, so the feature need not
be repeatedly applied.
5.3 Proving that featured omponents are safe
Our main result is a theorem whih shows that the abstration approah is
sound for safely featured omponents (see denition 10) that are not multi-
owned (see denition 11).
Theorem 12 Given a featured, parameterised system
S
n
= p
0
jjp
1
jj : : : jjp
n 1
or Cjjp
0
jjp
1
jj : : : jjp
n 2
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with modelM
n
, m (1  m  n), abstrat modelM
m
abs
onstruted as desribed
above, and formula  indexed by elements of f0; : : : ; m 1g, if the omponents
of S
n
are safely featured and none of the features are multi-owned, then the
omponents are safe.
Proof The proof is similar to that for basi omponents (see setion 4.2). For
all feature statement hoies that are not multi-owned, transitions arising from
exeuting the assoiated statement an be mathed by transitions arising from
the modied statement hoies in the abstrat model. However, this is not true
for feature statement hoies pertaining to features that are multi-owned.
Multi-owned features sometimes trigger a hange in behaviour beause the
host omponent has the feature, and sometimes beause the partner om-
ponent has the feature. The feature is implemented when either the host or
partner omponent has set a feature ag . As the feature ag ould have been
reset by an abstrat omponent, we an not simulate the possibility of an
abstrat omponent resetting this variable at any time. We an not simply
use non-deterministi hoie to deide whether the feature ag has been set
(presumably to Absid) beause to do so would assume that at some point an
existing, non-default value of the ag may have been overridden. This would
imply an earlier transition whih would not have been reeted in our simu-
lated model.
6 Interpreting results
From Theorem 12 we an see that if a formula  indexed by elements of
f0; 1; : : : ; m   1g holds for abstrat model M
m
abs
(with onrete omponents
p
0
; p
1
; : : : ; p
m 1
), then  holds for any model M
n
, (1  m  n), onsisting of
omponents p
0
; p
1
; : : : ; p
m 1
and n m other omponents, subsribing only to
safe features.
However, what an we onlude if, for some , M
m
abs
6j= ?
If we an show that for the small nite model M
m
= M(p
0
jjp
1
jj : : : jjp
m 1
),
M
m
6j= , then the ounterexample generated for M
m
will extend to M
n
, for
all 1  m  n. So we an onlude that M
n
6j= .
However, it is possible that M
m
j=  but M
m
abs
6j=  (possibly due to addi-
tional non-determinism introdued via the abstration proess. This is likely
to be the ase if  is a liveness property). In some instanes it might be pos-
sible to improve our abstration via a method of renement [13,30,5℄. This
would involve making the abstrat model more onrete, thereby allowing 
to beome true. This is the subjet of future work.
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7 Applying the approah
In this setion we onsider how models are onstruted automatially, and we
also give some experimental results.
7.1 Construting an abstrat model
Given a Promela speiation of a parameterised omponent (and a on-
text omponent, as required), and a xed m, the abstrat speiation is
onstruted as follows. First, transform the parameterised omponent(s) into
modular GC form. Seond, modify the omponent(s) to beome the (param-
eterised) onrete omponent (or modify the ontext omponent), and on-
strut the omponent Abs, as desribed in Setions 4.1 and 5.2. Third, dene
a proess whih runs m instantiations of the onrete omponent, along with
Abs. Finally, model hek the resulting speiation.
Eah of these steps an be automated, for example, we have implemented
them via Perl sripts.
Note that, if Promela omponents are expressed in GC form it is possible to
perform a syntati hek to ensure that they are indeed safe with respet
to the abstration approah. For example, a tool similar to SymmExtrator
[19℄ an be used to hek that loal variables seld and partnerid are used
appropriately and that omponents are open symmetri. We have not used
suh a tool here (the omponent desriptions were onstruted in suh a way
as to ensure safety). However, we intend to exploit this method in future work
to investigate the appliability of our abstration approah to pre-existing
Promela speiations of other parameterised systems.
7.2 Experimental results
Our approah holds for arbitrary veriation, but primarily we are interested
in feature interation analysis: For a given pair of features f
1
and f
2
hek
whether a property  dening feature f
1
is violated in the presene of feature
f
2
.
Below we give experimental results for feature interation analysis using our
approah. All of our experiments were performed on a PC with a 2.4GHz Intel
Xenon proessor, 3Gb of available main memory, running Linux (2.4.18), with
SPIN version 4.2.3.
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In tables 3 and 4 we give results for analysing example pairs of telephone
features, f
1
and f
2
, using SPIN. The examples hosen are ones whih do not
interat (that is, the property being heked is true in all ases) and therefore
an not be fully analysed exept for small, nite sized systems, without using
our abstration approah. The rst feature, f
1
, in all ases is TCS[0℄ = 1 (see
table 1) and  is [℄(onneted [1℄:to[0℄ == 0) (no onnetion from User [1℄ to
User [0℄ is possible).
In table 3, all of the feature pairs are subsribed to by the same User (User [0℄
in this ase) and are therefore referred to single user (SU) pairs. The indies
of the seond feature are hosen so that the size of the set indexed by  and
the pair of features (i.e. m) is 3. For example, when f
2
is CFU , the pair of
features under onsideration is TCS[0℄ = 1 and CFU [0℄ = 2. The index set is
f0; 1; 2g and m = 3.
In table 4 the feature pairs are subsribed to by dierent Users (known as
multi user (MU) pairs); indies are hosen so that m = 4.
In all ases we hek  for a model with m omponents, a model with m + 1
omponents and an abstrat model representing n omponents, where n is at
least m + 1. Note that in some ases we were unable to hek the MU model
for m + 1 omponents, due to insuÆient memory.
States is the number of states (10
3
) stored during searh, mem the memory
(in Mb) required for state storage and time the the total (user + system) time
(in seonds) taken for omplete veriation. All measurements are given to
one deimal plae. We use SPIN's inbuilt ompression algorithm to minimise
the memory requirements.
m m+ 1 n
f
2
states mem time states mem time states mem time
CFU 3.2 0.4 0.1 198.1 8.5 5.8 12.7 0.8 0.4
CFB 5.3 0.5 0.1 409.0 17.1 11.9 17.3 1.0 0.5
ODS 4.4 0.4 0.2 359.7 15.2 10.0 15.1 0.9 0.5
OCS 4.7 0.5 0.9 376.2 15.9 10.7 15.8 0.9 0.5
Table 3
SU results, telephone (m = 3)
In all ases the ost of model heking the abstrat speiation (in terms of
number of states, memory and time) is less than that for heking a system of
xed size m + 1 (and greater than that for a system of xed size m). Similar
results hold for the email example.
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m m+ 1 n
f
2
states mem time states mem time states mem time
CFU 162.9 7.2 4.7 15185.6 689.0 1297.7 720.0 32.9 33.3
CFB 400.7 16.6 15.3 - - - 1363.2 59.5 60.7
ODS 376.9 16.0 15.1 - - - 1278.8 56.6 58.5
OCS 396.2 16.9 15.6 - - - 1303.6 57.9 58.2
Table 4
MU results, telephone (m = 4)
8 Related work
Our indution approah involves onstruting a proess M
m
abs
, whih enap-
sulates the behaviour of any number of proesses. As suh, our approah is
similar to other indution approahes whih involve the onstrution of an
invariant proess. Kurshan et al [29℄ prove a strutural indution theorem
for proesses using the simulation pre-order (see setion 2) to generate an in-
variant when there is no ontext proess. Similar results are ahieved [7,38℄
by establishing a bisimulation equivalene between global state graphs of sys-
tems of dierent sizes. Extensions to these early results, when a (non-trivial)
ontext proess is involved, inlude [25,4,29,1℄. In some ases [36,15℄ network
grammars are used to generate both suitable families and an invariant.
A fully automated approah for verifying parameterized networks with syn-
hronous ommuniation is proposed in [21,22℄, and a tool based on the net-
work grammar approah [31℄ is designed to help in the onstrution of invari-
ants.
In [9℄ we introdued our generalisation tehnique for feature interation analy-
sis of a telephone system with any number of omponents. In [10,11℄ we applied
a similar approah to an email system, allowing limited sets of features in ab-
strat omponents. In [12℄ we began to investigate a more systemati way to
relax the onstraint on features in abstrat omponents and to formalise our
approah. We introdued the GC (guarded ommand) form as a uniform way
of expressing basi omponents and features. In [34℄ we introdued the onept
of safe feature and developed a ategorisation of safe features. We applied our
abstration approah in the ontext of feature interation analysis, giving a
detailed analysis of a realisti, featured telephony network.
Here we bring together all results in one omprehensive treatment and illus-
trate our approah via a set of simple and omplex examples.
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9 Conlusions
A general tehnique ombining model heking and abstration is presented
that allows property based analysis of ommuniating, onurrent systems
onsisting of an arbitrary number of omponents. The tehnique is based on
the leverage of a model heking result about a system of xed size, to results
about systems of arbitrary size. The omponents do not need to be isomorphi,
but their individual behaviour must fulll riteria whih we all safe. We give a
theorem that expresses how omponent safety an be ensured by inspetion of
the form of guards, when omponents are expressed in guarded ommand form.
The approah is further extended to allow featured omponents, where features
dene additional funtionality. We extend the notion of safe omponent to
inlude features, and give a theorem that expresses how omponent safety an
be ensured by inspetion of the form of the feature guards, when features are
expressed in guarded ommand form.
The main ontribution of this paper is to dene safe omponents, whih ensure
that the parameterised model heking problem is solvable, and to prove that
basi omponents and omponents with ertain ategories of features whih
onform to syntati riteria are safe.
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